We describe a framework for creating animated simulations of virtual human agents. The framework allows us to capture exible patterns of activity, reactivity to a changing environment, and certain aspects of an agent personality model. Each leads to variation in how an animated simulation will be realized. As di erent parts of an activity make di erent demands on an agent's resources and decision-making, our framework allows special-purpose reasoners and planners to be associated with only those phases of an activity where they are needed. Personality is re ected in locomotion choices which are guided by an agent model that interacts with the other components of the framework.
Introduction
Conventional animations often seek to re-create \life" through the artistic skills of an animator who, by drawing and painting, externalizes observations, experience, and intuition into the images, shapes, and movements that make for believable characters Thom81] . For three-dimensional computer animation, one has a more complex toolkit and a commensurately harder This research has been partially supported by DMSO DAAH04-94-G-0402; ARPA DAMD17-94-J-4486; U.S. Air Force DEPTH through Hughes Missile Systems F33615-91-C-0001; Air Force DAAH04-95-1-0151; NSF IRI95-04372; ARO DURIP DAAH04-95-1-0023; and ARPA AASERT DAAH04-94-G-0362.
task de ning exactly what makes an object into a character. Part of the problem is the control of multiple degrees of freedom: not only must the character do whatever is desired, it must also convey a feeling of liveliness, animacy, and engagement with the environment. Being able to simply walk from here to there is not enough; there should be purpose, reactivity, and attitude. We explore some of these issues in a discussion of a synthetic human agent architecture and a speci c implementation in a system called Jack R Badl93b].
Three primary mechanisms exist for specifying motion in a synthetic computer-generated character:
1. Direct manipulation of the body parts to the poses desired; 2. Actually perform the actions, so that the virtual agent mimics the participant's actual performance; 3. Instructing an agent in what to do, so that its behavior follows, in part, from the goals it has adopted. Recent automated techniques for animation aim to ease the animator's burden, but it appears that personality is typically established through skillful direct manipulations. As such, it is ad hoc and probably di cult to quantify and reproduce. Incorporating mathematical techniques for motion interpolation, and even using physics-based models, the agents tend to look personality-free at best and hapless mechanical mannequins at worst.
Producing animated people seems to require more than the existing physical or manual toolset. One response to this di culty is performance animation: live actors perform while sensing systems monitor various body parts such as hands Burd94], faces Will90], or landmarks Badl93a, Robe94] . While this provides motion data of unquestioned realism, it is only one instance of a performance: di erent conditions can lead to di erent motions because people adapt their behavior to circumstances through their unconscious reactions and conscious decision-making. Moreover, unless the performer is additionally a good actor, the personality of the performer is captured as well. This bias sometimes may be exactly what was desired, but at other times it is an unwelcome feature that must be suppressed by manual post-processing Brud95]. This may be possible for an agent's physical style, but behavioral characteristics that follow from their decision-making (or cognitive) style are another story.
We start by brie y reviewing our historical approaches to personality for animated humans. Then we will present a two-level architecture for intelligent agents, including computational approaches to patterns of human activity and how PaT-Nets capture such patterns for the production of animated simulations. Finally we will describe how agent personality variations can a ect the animated outcomes, both in terms of physical style and decision making/cognitive style.
Approaches to Animated Agent Personalities
Above we outlined three modes of controlling animation:
1. Manipulating the human agent directly to position and move it as desired; 2. Showing the human agent what to do, so it moves by imitation; 3. Telling the human agent what to do, so that its behavior follows, in part, from the goals it has adopted. We believe future real-time animations must converge to techniques (2) and (3): basically \do what I do" and \do what I tell you to do". Performancebased systems for virtual environments are forced to adopt technique (2). The economy of expression in verbalized commands requires considerable ongoing study of technique (3). But the techniques developed for direct manipulation (1) will emerge as the facilitator for the other two. Thus we consider the study of algorithmic techniques for human movement control to be an important endeavor for animating personalities for real-time agents.
Physical Style
About twenty years ago we began studying human movement notations in order to gain insight into what qualities and properties human movement observers and choreographics abstracted from the continuum of motion. Brie y, our rst \lesson learned" was that the formal (and even computationally tractable) structures of Labanotation Hutc70, Webe78] captured the form of movement but not its essence | that is, its character, style, or emotion. We learned that even Laban was aware of its limitations, and towards the end of his career developed another system called \E ort-Shape" Dell70]. This system sought to describe the \qualities" or shape of a movement without trying to bind it to speci c spatial locations or orientations.
In more physical terms, we saw E ort-Shape as seeking to characterize the rst and second derivatives of position, and we began to explore some of the possible relationships between E ort-Shape notation and computer animation techniques Badl89]. We felt that if we could characterize E ortShape qualities in terms of computational realizations, we could generate characters with various personalities or emotional content. While there were tantalizing beginnings to this process, we were stymied by other problems (such as modeling a decent human gure in the rst place) and so directed our attentions elsewhere. Only much later did some of this work re-surface under the guise of locomotion \styles" Ko94]: when the Jack gure was animated walking with bent torso and smooth motion, the walk conveyed a distinct pensive or sad look; Walking with upright torso, raised shoulders, and an abrupt gait conveyed a \macho" or aggressive look. We have not researched this speci c connection more thoroughly, but the underlying motion implementations are now su ciently developed to make the prospect both interesting and feasible.
Cognitive Style
Most animation tools provide manual control over images, shapes, and movements. Recently, more automated techniques for animation have been developed, often to ease some burden or other on the animator. For example, dynamics can be used to animate particles or objects responding to physical forces Hahn88, Wilh90] , and \ ocking" can be used to constrain interactions between gures in a scene Reyn87, Tu84] . Partial success can be judged from the various physics-based techniques that use \real-world" mathematics to get the motions \right" Cohe92, Sims94, Witk88] .
Unfortunately, getting animated gures to appear human-like seems to require more than the existing physical or manual toolset. One reaction to this di culty has been the \performance animation" noted earlier, where actors go through the necessary motions while sensing systems monitor various body landmarks. While this provides motion data of unquestioned realism, it is only a speci c instance of a performance and might still need massaging by an expert. For example, it may not be directly usable for a character of markedly di erent body size/shape than the original actor.
Moreover, while performance animation generally guarantees that the physics is correct | without building and evaluating the formulas { it still misses something. Consider the following scenario:
A pedestrian stands on a street corner, waiting for the light to change so that he can safely cross the street. Meanwhile a car is approaching the same intersection. What happens when the light changes? In this scenario, the performance-based data might be useful for animating the character's walk, though it could also be simulated through a locomotion generator Ko94]. In a scripted animation, the animator would be responsible for initiating the walk when the light changed and would also be controlling the car motions. Suppose we then removed the animator: A pedestrian completely driven by physics would be propelled across the street by his forward force. The car would also be moved by physics. If they arrived at the same place at the same time, the animation might be exciting but it would not be fun for either the car or the pedestrian. So what happens when we remove the animator is that we remove the pedestrian's decisions: human movement realism re ects decision-making in context. For realistic animation, synthetic humans must engage in such decision-making if we want them to share human qualities. Sensed human motions are insu cient because they re ect only decisions that have already been made. Physics is insu cient because there are no decisions outside the outcome of the mathematical laws. Conscious humans are neither puppets nor mannequins. They continually assess their surroundings (to validate expectations, avoid obstacles, minimize surprises etc. Webb95]), make choices, and plan for the future.
Di erent cognitive \styles" of sensing, decision-making and planning (including, for example, a agent's degree of commitment to his/her current goals Brat88]) can make animated human agents behave di erently in response to the same environment and symbolically-speci ed activity. Below we will describe several personality variants that are apropos to our project of having a set of animated humans play games of Hide and Seek Badl95]. These include styles of seeking a hiding place, styles of responding to inferred intentions of other agents, and styles of pursuit.
The Agent Architecture
Allowing behavior to follow from decisions made in context appears to be a prime motivator for human-like agents. In this section we outline our agent architecture as a two-level structure. The lower level functions as a Sense-Control-Act (SCA) loop, while a higher level executes a pre-de ned (but general) schema.
An agent can take action by virtue of having an SCA loop to produce locally-adaptive (reactive) behavior. In general, behaviors are considered \low level" capabilities of an agent, such as being able to locomote to], reach for], look at], etc. In this discussion, we shall concentrate primarily on the walking behavior, as it is clearly in uenced by the local structure of the environment, the presence of sensed obstacles, distance to the goal, etc.
An agent also manifests high-level patterns of activity and deliberation, which in turn can a ect the immediate formulation and parameters of an SCA loop. Such patterns are captured in our framework through parallel state-machines we call Parallel Transition Networks, or PaT-Nets. PaT-Nets can sequence actions based on the current state of the environment, of the goal, or of the system itself, and represent the tasks in progress, conditions to be monitored, resources used, and temporal synchronization. An agent's deliberations both prior to and during action can be captured through special purpose reasoners and planners associated with speci c states of a network.
In this framework, the agent can instantiate PaT-Nets to accomplish goals (e.g., go to the supply depot and pick up a new motor), while lowlevel control is mediated through direct sensing and action couplings in the SCA loop (e.g., controlling where the agent's feet step and making sure that s/he doesn't run into or trip over any obstacles). By linking numerical feedback streams (SCA loops) and state controllers (PaT-Nets supported by special-purpose reasoners and planners), we believe it is possible to obtain maximum exibility and maintain appropriate levels of speci cation in the animated simulation of virtual human agents Badl93b, Beck93].
The rest of this section brie y describes features of SCA loops and PaTNets. For more detail, see Badl95].
Low-Level Control: SCA Loops
The behavioral loop is a continuous stream of oating point numbers from the simulated environment. Simulated sensors map these data to the abstract results of perception and route them through control processes, each of which is independently attempting to solve a minimization problem. The results go to simulated e ectors or motor actions that enact changes on the agent or the world. This loop operates continuously.
The behavioral loop is modeled as a network of interacting sense, control, and action (SCA) processes, connected by arcs across which only oating point messages travel. An individual path from sensors to e ectors is referred to as a behavioral net. It is analogous to a complete behavior in an \emergent behavior" architecture such as Brooks' subsumption architecture Broo86] , except that nodes may be shared between behaviors, and arbitration (competition for e ector resources) may occur throughout the behavioral path and not just at the end-e ector level. The behavioral loop is modeled as a network with oating point connections in order to allow the application of low-level, unsupervised, reinforcement learning in the behavioral design process Beck95]. Here we brie y describe the components of an SCA loop.
Sensory Nodes Sensory nodes model or approximate the abstract, geometric results of object perception. They continuously generate signals describing the polar coordinate position (relative to the agent) of a particular object or of all objects of a certain type within a speci ed distance and eld of view.
Control Nodes Control nodes model the lowest level in uences on behavior. For example, control of locomotion is loosely based on Braitenberg's love and hate behaviors Brai84], here called attract and avoid. Control nodes are formulated as explicit minimizations using outputs to drive inputs to a desired value (similar to Wilhelms' Wilh90] use of Braitenberg's behaviors). They typically receive input signals directly from sensory nodes, and send outputs directly to action nodes, though they could be used in more abstract control situations.
Action Nodes Action nodes connect to the underlying human body model and directly execute routines de ned on the model (such as walking, balance, hand position, and torso orientation) and arbitrate among inputs, either by selecting one set of incoming signals or averaging all incoming signals. An example is the walk controller, which decides where to place the agent's next footstep and then connects to the locomotion generator Badl93b, Moor95] to achieve the step.
Our main use of SCA loops to date has been in locomotion reasoning.
High-Level Control: PaT-Nets
PaT-Nets are nite state machines with message passing and semaphore capabilities Beck94, Douv95] . Nodes are associated with processes that can invoke executable behaviors, other PaT-Nets, or specialized reasoners or planners. Invocation occurs when a node is entered. An arc transition between nodes in a PaT-Net may check a local condition evaluated within the PaT-Net or a global condition evaluated in an external environment. Arcs are prioritized, and a transition is made to a new node by selecting the rst arc with a true condition. Nodes may also support probabilistic transitions, re ecting the probability of transitioning to another node at a given clock tick. Monitors associated with a PaT-Net will execute an action if a general condition evaluates to true, regardless of the current state. In addition, a PaT-Net may have local state variables available to all processes and conditions, and may also take parameters on instantiation.
A running network is created by making an instance of the PaT-Net class. All running PaT-Net instances are embedded in a Lisp operating system that time-slices them into the overall simulation. While running, PaT-Nets can spawn new nets, communicate with each other, kill other nets, and/or wait (sleep) until a condition is met. Running nets can, for example, spawn new nets and then wait for them to exit (e ectively a subroutine call), or run in parallel with the new net, while maintaining communication with it. Because PaT-Nets are embedded in an object-oriented structure, new nets can be de ned that override, blend, or extend the functionality of existing nets.
Patterns of Activity
It has long been recognized that much of everyday human activity falls into patterns. In early work on computer-based story understanding, such patterns were captured in structures called \scripts" or \schemata" and were used to ll in what hadn't been said in a story as well as what had been said Scha77]. Scripts/schemata have also be used in generating behavior. For example, in \hierarchical planning" Sace77, Wilk88], a plan operator speci es a partially ordered pattern of actions or sub-goals that can be used to achieve a particular goal.
Here we want to make three points about patterns of activity: 1. Patterns have di erent sources: they may be idiosyncratic, peculiar to an individual; they may be cultural, simplifying interactions between people Cass94]; they may be occupational, as in a medic's initial assessment of a trauma patient Chi95]; or they may be recreational, as in the pattern of a game. 2. Patterns vary in their rigidity. They range from low-level xed pat-terns one may do daily without thinking { for example, putting one's left shoe on rst and then one's right { to high-level patterns of engagement where the particulars are subject to variation such as in having breakfast, making dinner, going out for dinner, playing golf, etc. The variation may re ect low-level reactions to circumstances, high-level decisions, or current state. 3. People may be engaged simultaneously in multiple patterns of activity.
Their resulting behavior may therefore re ect their allocating di erent resources to di erent patterns, using one pattern in support of another, time-slicing patterns or blending patterns. The next section shows how PaT-Nets can be used to capture patterns of activity in the game of Hide and Seek.
An Example of PaT-Net Agent Control
While there are many di erent sets of rules for Hide and Seek, most involve one player (who is \it" or the \seeker") rst averting his/her eyes while the other players hide, then setting out to nd at least one of them, then engaging in some competition with whomever is found, which may then lead to that other player becoming \it" in the next round. Thus Hide and Seek manifests a pattern of behavior whose realization may vary from instance to instance as players hide in di erent places, as di erent players are found, and as the competition between the player who is \it" and the player who is found yields di erent results. Here we show how this kind of pattern is easily supported in PaT-Nets.
The high-level controller, or PlayNet, for simulating one common version of Hide and Seek is illustrated in Figure 1 . In this version, a hider, once hidden, does not move until seen by the seeker, at which time the hider attempts to run home without being tagged by the seeker. In Figure 1 , the Sync node causes players to wait until all the players are \home", at which point the seeker may begin counting (Count) and the other players start to hide (Hide). The Evade node has a player running to home base, while avoiding the seeker. (Currently this sort of multi-goal behavior is handcoded while a more general approach to multiple goal integration is worked out.) Dashed transitions in the network represent a change in role from hider to seeker or vice-versa. The at home condition becomes true when the agent is at home-base, while the safe condition becomes true when the seeker notices that the hider he is pursuing has made it home. While a PlayNet speci es an entire game of Hide and Seek, each player a personal copy, which records features of the game speci c to that player (e.g., whether the player has been seen by the seeker or made it home safely), as well as features of the global state of the game (e.g., whether all hiders have made it home safely).
To support agent coordination, two types of communicative mechanisms have been used in Hide and Seek. First, the environment itself is used: Players have limited (simulated) perceptual abilities which allow them to see unobstructed nearby things in their environment. This supports the coordination involved in see/seen in Figure 1 . Second, coordination of all agents is handled through semaphores. For example, in Figure 1 , count done is broadcast to all agents, as are tag/tagged and at home/safe, since such information is relevant to all players but cannot be insured known through the players' limited perception.
Focusing now on the processes associated with individual nodes of a PlayNet, these may either be intrinsically terminating, as in count (count to 10), indicated by a black dot on the arc, or externally terminating by virtue of some event in the environment. For example, search is only terminated when circumstances provide the seeker with a hider. Note that intrinsically terminating processes may also be interrupted by external events, stopping them before completion. For example, evade (i.e., run home while evading the seeker) is intrinsically terminated by the hider reaching home, but may be interrupted by the hider being tagged. For PaT-Nets to support this, actions must be cleanly preemptable, so that the simulation programmer can pass in a condition for premature termination. The use of special purpose reasoners and planners in the context of speci c processes is illustrated in two of the nodes of Figure 1 { hide and search. Currently during hide, a special purpose reasoner is invoked when the node is entered, that evaluates the set of hiding places the agent knows about and chooses one that maximizes the agent's preference criteria. Each agent has di erent preferences regarding a hiding place { di ering by the importance of its distance from the seeker, the number of available exits, etc. Once a hiding place is chosen, the agent moves towards it. One can imagine, though, a more sophisticated reasoner for choosing hiding places that would be able to work in previously \unknown" environments and that would provide more room for the expression of cognitive style. Such a reasoner might carry out noticing and evaluating hiding places in parallel, while moving away from \home". Since all hiders are simultaneously looking for hiding places, agent personality can be expressed in their response to contention for a hiding place. An non-combative agent might acquiesce and seek another spot as soon as it \realizes" there may be contention for its current chosen target. A confrontational agent might respond quite di erently.
Another special purpose reasoner is illustrated in the search node. Searching is viewed as choosing a place to look for a hider, and then doing what one needs to get there ( Geib95, Moor93] ). Choosing a place to look involves keeping track of where one has looked already and reasoning about what remaining spaces can contain an agent that the seeker cannot see. Unlike hiding currently, seeking does not assume the seeker knows about all possible hiding places a priori. More e ort has been put into a model of realistic seeking than hiding.
Behavioral Control of Human Locomotion Based on Personality
The aim is to design and build a system in which an animator has control over the agent model. This includes personality traits such as curiosity and cautiousness, and state information such as the agent's energy level and alertness. The animator sets high-level locomotion goals for the agent. The system generates locomotion automatically based on the agent model, shaping the locomotion to re ect and convey to an observer the agent state and personality chosen by the animator.
As an example, consider an animator who is given the task of modeling several agents playing hide and seek in an outdoor environment. We will look at two in particular: Marge and Homer. In the scene to be animated, Homer is in his hiding place and Marge is seeking. The animator opens the agent model interface window and con gures the agents beginning with Homer. She clicks on the \Speed" button with the mouse and a slider-bar appears. She chooses a relatively fast speed of 9.0 (out of 10.0). Then she sets Homer's \Awareness" of his surroundings to 9.5.
The animator con gures Marge in a similar way, also setting her \Aware-ness" to 9.0, but setting her \Speed" to 6.0. She wants to nd a hider quickly, but not to move so quickly that she misses someone. Finally, that animator wants to allow Marge to notice and react to hiders as they become visible. She de nes a LISP condition which evaluates to TRUE when Marge can see a hider. The probability of reacting to this condition when it becomes TRUE She relates to Marge's \Awareness" level. If this happens, a new schema is adopted with the goal \go to hider", followed by schemata that cause Marge to tag the hider and bring everyone home, ending the game. When the animator tests the con gurations by starting the locomotion control systems, she sees the following.
Marge begins exploring the environment. She is walking somewhat quickly, entering and exiting small structures and avoiding obstacles. As she walks from one building to another, she notices Homer hiding in the alley between them. She stops, turns toward Homer, and begins chasing him. Homer notices Marge immediately, turns away from her, and runs away. The animator shows the animation to a colleague. After a few minutes of discussion and a small amount of parameter adjustment, she is satis ed that the agents appear to have the desired personalities. What follows is a description of our multi-level locomotion control system that supports this embodiment of a character's personality traits in their locomotion choices and characteristics.
This system controls locomotion at three levels. At the lowest level, a behavioral simulation system controls agent locomotion directly based on a behavioral loop associated with the agent (Sec. 3.1). This level makes nal choices about where the agent will place his feet at each step. The second level consists of PaT-Nets (Sec. 3.2) that control agent locomotion indirectly by scheduling and controlling reactive behaviors. Above this is an \agent model" to con gure the state-machine and parameterize the behaviors so that the agent's locomotion style re ects its personality, and physical and mental state.
The behavioral simulation system Beck93] communicates directly with a human locomotion system Ko94] choosing each footstep for the agent based on a set of behaviors associated with that agent. The behaviors are variations of attraction and avoidance and are completely parameterizable. The agent's observed behavior is the result of the choice of behaviors and parameters which are themselves the results of choices made at higher levels.
There are limits to what low-level reactive behaviors can achieve. When the desired complexity of an agent's behavior increases beyond this limit, higher-level locomotion reasoning must be introduced. Locomotion reasoning determines the characteristics of an agent's locomotion: i.e., what types of attractions and avoidances with what choice of parameters will achieve the goal. This is done via PaT-Nets.
PaT-Nets and their special purpose reasoners support complex behaviors such as chasing and path-following where behaviors and parameters change over time (Sec. 5). In addition to changing behaviors and parameters, the state-machine structure allows us to evaluate, in parallel, arbitrary conditions, passed as arguments. If any of these conditions ever evaluate to TRUE, the state-machine takes an appropriate action. These conditions allow the agent to interrupt the current plan when an unexpected situation occurs, e.g., when something of interest enters the agent's eld-of-view. An appropriate message is passed up to the calling system allowing it to replan.
The agent model, a set of agent characteristics or attributes, is a global structure of attributes that can a ect the con guration of the state-machine which in turn a ects the agent's perceived behavior. In an attempt to straighten locomotion paths, we add an \inertia" behavior to an agent's behavior set which attracts the agent to the forward direction. An inebriated agent is given a low Inertia value and tends to meander as a result.
When we walk around in the presence of other people we attempt to avoid them based not only on their current location, but also on a guess of where they will be one or more steps in the future. Consciously or unconsciously, we anticipate their potential locations in the near future and base our avoidance on this prediction. An inebriated agent has a lower Anticipation value than normal, while an agent who is particularly aware of his surroundings will anticipate more.
Condition is a special system feature implemented at the state-machine level. It is a hook which allows the animator to implement behaviors, particularly those involving sub-goals, and make decisions that are unsupported by the architecture. When an arbitrary condition evaluates to TRUE, the state-machine takes an appropriate action, possibly stopping the agent and exiting. This allows a higher-level system to replan, taking advantage of the opportunity. A condition, for example, might evaluate to TRUE when an enemy is in the agent's eld-of-view. Consider this scenario. We see a burglar walk past a police o cer. The burglar notices the o cer and starts running (his sense of urgency increases). He tries to nd a good hiding place while the o cer pursues him. Our system is capable of simulating this scenario.
Although the burglar passes the o cer, in real life, there is no guarantee that they would notice each other. Probability refers to the probability that an agent will react to the condition evaluating to TRUE. The probability is high when the agent is aware of his surroundings or curious, but low when he is distracted, inebriated, or rushed, for example.
Conclusion
We have just begun to explore the power of this agent architecture. Many questions have been identi ed for further study. They include: the viability of con ning high-level reasoning and planning to particular nodes of a PaT-Net. It may be that in other activities, reasoning and planning need a more global purview or need to be interleaved in as yet unforeseen ways. the range of activities worth framing in a net-based approach: the greater the number of nodes, the greater the connectivity between them, and the greater the complexity of the arc conditions, the less a net-based approach seems to make sense. In other words, we would like to identify criteria we can use to decide when to employ a rstprinciples planner and when we can use a network of pre-determined decision points. It is possible that learning a task or becoming more expert at something entails a migration from planning as a node to more focused networks of choices. a clear regimen for mapping instructions for a task or game (including warnings and constraints) to one or more communicating PaT-Nets. the mechanism for incorporating other personality traits, especially non-locomotor ones. Preliminary investigations into two-person synthetic communication has already yielded insights into personality inuences on speech, dialogue, turn-taking, and gesture Cass94]. We have noted here that synthetic humans must also be able to adapt to circumstances if we want them to share human qualities. Motion performance is not su cient because we do not know yet how to readily adapt it to other circumstances. Even when behavior essentially follows a pattern, as in going to a supermarket, playing a game, or trouble-shooting and/or repairing equipment, people sense the world around them, react and make choices in ways that adapt the pattern to their personalities and circumstances. It is supporting exible patterns of activity that motivates much of our research. We see animation as an integration of a rich collection of interacting techniques, organized in a principled, structured representation. Here we have discussed its use in representing exible patterns of human activity in uenced by personality.
Our experiments so far indicate that the representational e cacy of this architecture of behavioral reaction, transition networks, symbolic planning, and certain personality attributes is necessary for modeling actions of human-like agents. Whether it is su cient is a question for the future.
